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Unconditionally secure nonrelativistic bit commitment is known to be impossible in both the classical and
the quantum worlds. But when committing to a string of n bits at once, how far can we stretch the quantum
limits? In this paper, we introduce a framework for quantum schemes where Alice commits a string of n bits
to Bob in such a way that she can only cheat on a bits and Bob can learn at most b bits of information before
the reveal phase. Our results are twofold: we show by an explicit construction that in the traditional approach,
where the reveal and guess probabilities form the security criteria, no good schemes can exist: a+b is at least
n. If, however, we use a more liberal criterion of security, the accessible information, we construct schemes
where a=4 log2 n+O1 and b=4, which is impossible classically. We furthermore present a cheat-sensitive
quantum bit string commitment protocol for which we give an explicit tradeoff between Bob’s ability to gain
information about the committed string, and the probability of him being detected cheating.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.78.022316 PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Commitments play an important role in modern day cryp-
tography. Informally, a commitment allows one party to
prove that she has made up her mind and cannot change it,
while hiding the actual decision until later. Imagine two mu-
tually distrustful parties Alice and Bob at distant locations.
They can only communicate over a channel, but want to play
the following game: Alice secretly chooses a bit x. Bob
wants to be sure that Alice indeed has made her choice. At
the same time, Alice wants to keep x hidden from Bob until
she decides to reveal x. To convince Bob that she made up
her mind, Alice sends Bob a commitment. From the commit-
ment alone, Bob cannot deduce x. At a later time, Alice re-
veals x and enables Bob to open the commitment. Bob can
now check if Alice is telling the truth. This scenario is known
as bit commitment.
Bit commitment is a very powerful cryptographic primi-
tive with a wide range of applications. It has been shown that
quantum oblivious transfer QOT 1 can be achieved pro-
vided there exists a secure bit commitment scheme 2,3. In
turn, oblivious transfer is known to be sufficient for solving
the general problem of secure two-party computation 4,5.
Commitments are also useful for constructing zero-
knowledge proofs 6. Furthermore, a bit commitment proto-
col can be used to implement secure coin tossing 7. Clas-
sically, unconditionally secure bit commitment is known to
be impossible. Unfortunately after several quantum schemes
were suggested 8–10, nonrelativistic quantum bit commit-
ment has also been shown to be impossible 11–16. Only
very limited degrees of concealment and binding can be
achieved 17. In the face of these negative statements, what
can we still hope to achieve?
A. String commitment
Here we take a different approach and look at the task of
committing to a string of n bits at once in the setting where
Alice and Bob have unbounded resources. Since perfect bit
commitment is impossible, perfect string commitment is im-
possible, too. However, is it possible to design meaningful
string commitment schemes when we allow for a small abil-
ity to cheat on both Alice’s and Bob’s side? To make this
question precise, we introduce a framework for the classifi-
cation of string commitments in terms of the length n of the
string, Alice’s ability to cheat on a bits and Bob’s ability to
acquire b bits of information before the reveal phase. Instead
of asking for a perfectly binding commitment, we allow Al-
ice to reveal up to 2a strings successfully: Bob will accept
any such string as a valid opening of the commitment. For-
mally, we demand that x0 , 1npx
A2a, where px
A is the
probability that Alice successfully reveals string x during the
reveal phase. Contrary to classical computing, Alice can al-
ways choose to perform a superposition of string commit-
ments without Bob’s knowledge. Thus even for a perfectly
binding string commitment we would only demand
x0 , 1npx
A1, since a strategy based on superpositions is
indistinguishable from the “classical” honest behavior of
choosing a string beforehand and then committing to it. At
the same time, we relax Bob’s security condition, and allow
him to acquire at most b bits of information before the reveal
phase. The nature of his security definition is crucial to our
investigation: If b determines a bound on his probability to
guess Alice’s string, then we prove that a+b is at least n up
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to a small constant. We write n ,a ,b-QBSC for a quantum
bit string commitment protocol where the string has length n
and a and b are the security parameters for Alice and Bob as
explained in detail below. In Sec. II, we show:
Impossibility of n ,a ,b QBSC. Every n ,a ,b-QBSC
scheme with a+b+cn is insecure, where c7.61.
Our proof makes use of privacy amplification with two-
universal hash functions. If the protocol is executed multiple
times in parallel, we prove that any quantum bit string com-
mitment protocol with a+bn is insecure. We refer to these
results as “impossibilities,” as they show that QBSCs offer
almost no advantage over the trivial classical protocol: Alice
first sends b bits of the n bit string to Bob during the commit
phase, and then supplies him with the remaining n−b bits in
the reveal phase.
The second part of the paper is devoted to the “possibil-
ity” of QBSC. If we weaken our standard of security and
measure Bob’s information gain in terms of the accessible
information, it becomes possible to construct meaningful
QBSC protocols with a=4 log2 n+O1 and b=4. Our pro-
tocols are based on the effect of locking classical information
in quantum states 18. This surprising effect shows that
given an initial shared quantum state, the transmission of l
classical bits can increase the total amount of correlation by
more than l bits. In Sec. III, we show the following.
Possibility of n ,a ,b−QBSCIacc. For n3, there exist
n ,4 log2 n+O1 ,4−QBSCIacc protocols.
We then turn our attention to a specific n ,1 ,n /2
−QBSCIacc protocol. Note that Bob is able to gain quite large
amounts of mutual information  n2bits with Alice’s commit-
ted string before the reveal phase. As we show in this paper,
however, Bob’s cheating will be detected by Alice with posi-
tive probability if he performs any measurement that leads to
a positive information gain; in other words, the protocol is
cheat-sensitive against Bob. More precisely, we give an ex-
plicit tradeoff between Bob’s information gain and Alice’s
ability to catch him cheating. In Sec. IV, we show the fol-
lowing.
Cheat-sensitive n ,1 ,n /2−QBSCIacc. There exists an
n ,1 ,n /2−QBSCIacc that is cheat-sensitive against Bob: if
Bob is detected cheating with probability less than p, then
the mutual information that he gained by measurement be-
fore the reveal phase is bounded by 4	p log2 d+22	p
where x=min−x log2 x ,1 /e.
B. Related work
To obtain bit commitment, different restrictions have been
introduced into the model. Salvail 19 showed that, for any
fixed n, secure bit commitment is possible provided that the
sender is not able to perform generalized measurements on
more then n qubits coherently. Large n coherent measure-
ments are not yet feasible, so his result provides an imple-
mentation which is secure under a plausible technological
assumption. DiVincenzo, Smolin, and Terhal took a different
approach 20, showing that if the bit commitment is forced
to be ancilla-free, a type of asymptotic security is still pos-
sible. Bit commitment is also possible if the adversary’s
quantum storage is bounded 21–23 or noisy 24. Classi-
cally, introducing restrictions can also open new possibilities.
Cachin, Crépeau, and Marcil have shown how to implement
bit commitment via oblivious transfer under the assumption
that the size of the receiver’s memory is bounded 25. Fur-
thermore, the assumption of a noisy channel can be sufficient
for oblivious transfer 26,27. A cryptographic task—called
cheat-sensitive bit commitment—has been studied by Hardy
and Kent 28, as well as Aharanov, Ta-Shma, Vazirani, and
Yao 29: no restrictions are placed on the adversary initially,
but an honest party should stand a good chance of catching a
cheater. Kent also showed that bit commitment can be
achieved using relativistic constraints 30.
Classically, string commitment is directly linked to bit
commitment and no interesting protocols are possible. Kent
31 first asked what kind of quantum string commitment
QBSC can be achieved. He gave a protocol under the re-
strictive assumption that Alice does not commit to a super-
position 32. His protocol was modified for experimental
purposes by Tsurumaru 33.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Framework
We first formalize the notion of quantum string commit-
ments in a quantum setting.
Definition 1. An n ,a ,b-quantum bit string commitment
QBSC is a quantum communication protocol between two
parties, Alice the committer and Bob the receiver, which
consists of two phases and two security requirements.
Commit phase. Assume that both parties are honest. Alice
chooses a string x 0,1n with probability px. Alice and
Bob communicate and at the end Bob holds state x.
Reveal phase. If both parties are honest, Alice and Bob
communicate and at the end Bob learns x. Bob accepts.
Concealing. If Alice is honest, x0 , 1np
x
x
B 2b, where
p
x
x
B is the probability that Bob correctly guesses x before the
reveal phase.
Binding. If Bob is honest, then for all commitments of
Alice: x0 , 1npx
A2a, where px
A is the probability that Alice
successfully reveals x.
We say that Alice successfully reveals a string x if Bob
accepts the opening of x, i.e., he performs a test depending
on the individual protocol to check Alice’s honesty and con-
cludes that she was indeed honest. Note that quantumly, Al-
ice can always commit to a superposition of different strings
without being detected. Thus even for a perfectly binding bit
string commitment i.e., a=0 we only demand that
x0 , 1npx
A1, whereas classically one wants that p
x
A
=x,x. Note that our concealing definition reflects Bob’s a
priori knowledge about x. We choose an a priori uniform
distribution i.e., px=2−n for n ,a ,b-QBSCs, which natu-
rally comes from the fact that we consider n-bit strings. A
generalization to any PX ,a ,b-QBSC where PX is an arbi-
trary distribution is possible but omitted in order not to ob-
scure our main line of argument. Instead of Bob’s guessing
probability, one can take any information measure B to ex-
press the security against Bob. In general, we consider an
n ,a ,b-QBSCB where the new concealing condition BE
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b holds for any ensemble E= px ,x that Bob can obtain
by a cheating strategy. In the latter part of this paper we
show that for B being the accessible information nontrivial
protocols, i.e., protocols with a+bn, exist. The accessible
information is defined as IaccE=maxM IX ;Y, where PX is
the prior distribution of the random variable X, Y is the ran-
dom variable of the outcome of Bob’s measurement on E,
and the maximization is taken over all measurements M.
B. Model
We work in the model of two-party nonrelativistic quan-
tum protocols of Yao 2 and then simplified by Lo and Chau
12 which is usually adopted in this context. Here, any two-
party quantum protocol can be regarded as a pair of quantum
machines Alice and Bob, interacting through a quantum
channel. Consider the product of three Hilbert spaces HA,
HB, and HC of bounded dimensions representing the Hilbert
spaces of Alice’s and Bob’s machines and the channel, re-
spectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that each
machine is initially in a specified pure state. Alice and Bob
perform a number of rounds of communication over the
channel. Each such round can be modeled as a unitary trans-
formation on HAHC and HBHC, respectively. Since the
protocol is known to both Alice and Bob, they know the set
of possible unitary transformations used in the protocol. We
assume that Alice and Bob are in possession of both a quan-
tum computer and a quantum storage device. This enables
them to add ancillae to the quantum machine and use revers-
ible unitary operations to replace measurements. By doing
so, Alice and Bob can delay measurements and thus we can
limit ourselves to protocols where both parties only measure
at the very end. Moreover, any classical computation or com-
munication that may occur can be simulated by a quantum
computer. Furthermore, any probabilistic operation can be
modeled as an operation that is conditional on the outcome
of a coin flip. Instead of a classical coin, we can use a quan-
tum coin and in this way keep the whole system fully quan-
tum mechanical.
C. Tools
We now gather the essential ingredients for our proof.
First, we show that every n ,a ,b-QBSC is an
n ,a ,b-QBSC. The security measure E is defined by
E  n − H2
AB
 , 1
where AB=xpx
xx
 x and =xpxx only depend on the
ensemble E= px ,x. H2 is an entropic quantity defined in
Ref. 34 H2
AB
−log2 TrI −1/2AB2. This quan-
tity is directly connected to Bob’s maximal average probabil-
ity of successfully guessing the string.
Lemma 1. Bob’s maximal average probability of success-
fully guessing the committed string, i.e., supMxpxp
x
x
B,M
where M ranges over all measurements and p
y
x
B,M is the con-
ditional probability of guessing y given x, obeys
sup
M

x
pxp
x
x
B,M  2−H2
AB
.
Proof. By definition the maximum average guessing prob-
ability is lower bounded by the average guessing probability
for a particular measurement strategy. We choose the square-
root measurement which has operators Mx= px−1/2x−1/2.
p
x
x
B
=TrMxx is the probability that Bob guesses x given x,
hence
log2
x
pxp
x
x
B,max log2
x
px
2Tr−1/2x−1/2x
= log2 TrI  −1/2AB2 = − H2
AB

Related estimates were derived in Ref. 35. For the uniform
distribution px=2−n we have from the concealing condition
that xp
x
x
B 2b which by lemma 1 implies Eb and
hence the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Every n ,a ,b-QBSC is an n ,a ,b-QBSC.
Furthermore, we make use of the following theorem,
known as privacy amplification against a quantum adversary.
In our case, Bob holds the quantum memory and privacy
amplification is used to find Alice’s attack.
Theorem 1 [Th. 5.5.1 in Ref. 34 (see also Ref. 36)]. Let
G be a class of two-universal hash functions from 0,1n to
0,1s. Application of gG to the random variable X maps
the ensemble E= px ,x to Eg= qyg ,	yg with probabilities
qy
g
=xg−1ypx and quantum states 	y
g
=xg−1ypxx. Then
1

G
 gG dEg
1
2
2−1/2H2
AB
−s, 2
where dExpx
xx
 x , I /2n  and similarly for
dEg and 
 , 12 
−1 with A1=Tr	A†A.
Finally, the following reasoning, previously used to prove
the impossibility of quantum bit commitment 11,12, will be
essential: Suppose 0 and 1 are density operators that cor-
respond to a commitment of a “0” or a “1,” respectively. Let

0 and 
1 be the corresponding purifications on the joint
system of Alice and Bob. If 0 equals 1 then Alice can find
a local unitary transformation U that she can apply to her
part of the system and satisfying 
1=U I
0. This en-
ables Alice to change the total state from 
0 to 
1 and
thus cheat. This also holds in an approximate sense 11,
used here in the following form.
Lemma 3. Let 0 ,1 and assume that the bit-
commitment protocol is error-free if both parties are honest.
Then there is a method for Alice to cheat such that the prob-
ability of successfully revealing a 0 given that she committed
to a 1 is greater or equal to 1−	2.
Proof. 0 ,1 implies F0 ,11−. F is the fidel-
ity of two quantum states, which equals maxU
0
U
 I
1
 by Uhlmann’s theorem. Here, 
0 and 
1 are the
joint states after the commit phase and the maximization
ranges over all unitaries U on Alice’s i.e., the purification
side. Let 
0=U I
1 for a U achieving the maximization.
Then

00
, 
00
 = 	1 − 
0
0
2  	1 − 1 − 2  	2 .
If both parties are honest, the reveal phase can be regarded as
a measurement resulting in a distribution PY PZ if 
0

0 was the state before the reveal phase. The random
POSSIBILITY, IMPOSSIBILITY, AND CHEAT ... PHYSICAL REVIEW A 78, 022316 2008
022316-3
variables Y and Z carry the opened bit or the value “reject
r.” Since the trace distance does not increase under mea-
surements PY , PZ
00
 , 
00
	2. Hence
1
2 
PY0− PZ0
+ 
PY1− PZ1
+ 
PYr− PZr
	2.
Since 
0 corresponds to Alice’s honest commitment to 0
we have PY0=1, PY1= PYr=0, and hence PZ01
−
	2. 
III. IMPOSSIBILITY
The proof of our impossibility result consists of three
steps: in the previous section, we saw that any
n ,a ,b-QBSC is also an n ,a ,b-QBSC with the security
measure E defined by Eq. 1. Below, we prove that an
n ,a ,b-QBSC can only exist for values a, b, and n obeying
a+b+cn, where c is a small constant independent of a, b,
and n. This in turn implies the impossibility of an
n ,a ,b-QBSC for such parameters. At the end of this sec-
tion we show that many executions of the protocol can only
be secure if a+bn.
The intuition behind our main argument is simple. To
cheat, Alice first chooses a two-universal hash function g.
She then commits to a superposition of all strings for which
gx=y for a specific y. We know from the privacy amplifi-
cation theorem above, however, that even though Bob may
gain some knowledge about x, he is entirely ignorant about
y. But then Alice can change her mind and move to a differ-
ent set of strings for which gx=y with yy as we saw
above. Figure 1 illustrates this idea.
Theorem 2. n ,a ,b-QBSC schemes, and thus also
n ,a ,b-QBSC schemes, with a+b+cn do not exist. c is a
constant equal to 5 log2 5−47.61.
Proof. Consider an n ,a ,b-QBSC and the case where
both Alice and Bob are honest. Alice committed to x. We
denote the joint state of the Alice-Bob-channel system HA
HBHC after the commit phase by 
x for input state 
x.
Let x be Bob’s reduced density matrix and let E= px ,x,
where px=2−n.
Assuming that Bob is honest, we will give a cheating
strategy for Alice in the case where a+b+5 log2 5−4n.
The strategy will depend on the two-universal hash function
g :X= 0,1n→Y= 0,1n−m, for appropriately chosen m. Al-
ice picks a yY and prepares the state
xg−1y
x
x /	
g−1y
. She then gives the second half of
this state as input to the protocol and stays honest for the rest
of the commit phase. The joint state of Alice and Bob at the
end of the commit phase is thus 
y
g
= xg−1y
x
x /	
g−1y
. The reduced states on Bob’s
side are 	y
g
=
1
qyg
xg−1ypxx with probability qy
g
=xg−1ypx.
We denote this ensemble by Eg. Let 	=	g=yqyg	yg for all g.
We now apply theorem 1 with s=n−m and Eb to
obtain 1
G
gGdEg, where = 122−1/2m−b. Hence, there is
at least one g such that dEg; intuitively, this means that
Bob knows only very little about the value of gx. This g
defines Alice’s cheating strategy. It is straightforward to
verify that dEg implies
2−n−m
y
	,	y
g 2 . 3
Let us therefore assume without loss of generality that Alice
chooses y0Y with 	 ,	y0
g 2.
Clearly, the probability to successfully reveal some x in
g−1y given 
y
g is one. Note that Alice learns x, but cannot
pick it: she committed to a superposition and x is chosen
randomly by measurement. Thus the probability to reveal y
i.e., to reveal an x such that y=gx given 
y
g successfully
is 1. Let p˜x and q˜y
g denote the probabilities to successfully
reveal x and y, respectively, and p˜
x
y
g be the conditional prob-
ability to successfully reveal x, given y. We have

x
p˜x = 
y
q˜y
g 
xg−1y
p˜
x
y
g 
y
q˜y
g
.
Recall that Alice can transform 
y0
g  approximately into 
y
g
if 	y0
g is sufficiently close to 	y
g by applying local transfor-
mations to her part alone. It follows from lemma 3 that we
can estimate the probability of revealing y, given that the
state was really 
y0. Since this reasoning applies to all y, on
average, we have

y
q˜y
g 
y
1 – 21/2	y0
g
,	y
g1/2 2n−m
− 21/22n−m2m−n
y
	y0
g
,	y
g1/2
 2n−m1 – 21/22m−n
y
	y0
g
,	 + 	,	y
g1/2
 2n−m1 – 221/2 ,
where the first inequality follows from lemma 3, the second
from Jensen’s inequality and the concavity of the square root
function, the third from the triangle inequality and the fourth
from Eq. 3 and 	y0
g
,	2. Recall that to be secure
against Alice, we require 2a2n−m1–221/2. We insert
= 122
−1/2m−b
, define m=b+ and take the logarithm on both
sides to get
FIG. 1. Color online Moving from y to y.
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a + b +   n , 4
where =−log21–2−/4+1. Keeping in mind that
1–2−/4+10 or, equivalently, 4, we find that the mini-
mum value of  for which Eq. 4 is satisfied is 
=5 log2 5−4 and arises from =4log2 5−1. Thus, no
n ,a ,b-QBSC with a+b+5 log2 5−4n exists. 
Since the constant c does not depend on a, b, and n,
multiple parallel executions of the protocol in the form of
multiple simultaneous commit phases followed by the corre-
sponding opening phases, can only be secure if a+bn:
Proposition 1. Let P be an n ,a ,b-QBSC or
n ,a ,b-QBSC. The m-fold parallel execution of P will be
insecure if a+bn−c /m. In particular, no n ,a ,b-QBSC
or n ,a ,b-QBSC with a+bn can be executed securely an
arbitrary number of times in parallel. Furthermore, no
n ,a ,b-QBSC with a+bn and  the Holevo information
can be executed securely an arbitrary number of times in
parallel.
Proof. In the following, we assume without loss of gen-
erality that a and b are the smallest cheat parameters for P.
Let Q denote the nm ,am ,bm-QBSC or nm ,am ,bm-QBSC
protocol obtained by executing P m times in parallel. By
theorem 2, Q is insecure if am+bmnm−c. Since a and b
were assumed to be the smallest cheat parameters for P, the
product cheating attack by Alice and Bob lead to the esti-
mates amam and bmbm, respectively. Therefore, the
m-fold execution of P is insecure, if am+bmam+bm
nm−c or a+bn−c /m.
In order to prove the result about Holevo information
QBSC, we will use a slightly different characterization of
privacy amplification in the proof of theorem 2. In this char-
acterization, the right-hand side of Eq. 2 is replaced by 
+2−1/2Hmin
 
AB
B−s for an arbitrary 0 Ref. 34 Corol-
lary 5.6.1. Going through the proof with this change in
mind, one sees that Q is not a nm ,am ,bm-QBSC for
E˜=nm−Hmin 
˜AB
˜ if am+bm+mn. Here, E˜ is the
ensemble corresponding to Q and ˜AB and ˜ the related
states;  is a positive constant independent of n. Since
E˜ =Em and thus ˜AB=ABm and ˜AB=ABm we are able to in-
voke the estimate
1
m
Hmin
 
AB
m
m HAB − H − 3 ,
where  ,m→0 as m→ 34 in order to conclude that Q
is not a nm ,am ,bm-QBSCmE+2 if am+bm+mn. This
shows that if P is a nm ,am ,bm-QBSCmE+2 with 
mm
+mmam+bmnm−, i.e., 
m+mn− /m, then its
m-fold execution cannot be secure. Taking m to infinity we
see that if P is an n ,a ,b-QBSC with a+bn then it can-
not be executed securely an arbitrary number of times in
parallel. 
It follows directly from Ref. 37 that the results in this
section also hold in the presence of superselection rules.
IV. POSSIBILITY
Surprisingly, if one is willing to measure Bob’s ability to
learn x using the accessible information, nontrivial protocols
become possible. These protocols are based on a discovery
known as “locking of classical information in quantum
states” 18.
Family of protocols
The protocol, which we call LOCKCOM n ,U, uses this
effect and is specified by a set U= U1 , . . . ,U
U
 of unitaries.
Commit phase. Alice has the string x 0,1n and ran-
domly chooses r 1, . . . , 
U
. She sends the state Ur
x to
Bob, where UrU.
Reveal phase. Alice announces r and x. Bob applies Ur
†
and measures in the computational basis to obtain x. He
accepts if and only if x=x.
We first show that our protocol is secure with respect to
definition 1 if Alice is dishonest. Note that our proof only
depends on the number of unitaries used, and is independent
of a concrete instantiation of the protocol.
Lemma 4. Any LOCKCOM n ,U protocol is
log2
U
-binding, i.e., 2a 
U
.
Proof. Let pxA denote the probability that Alice reveals x
successfully. Then, px
Arpx,r
A
, where px,r
A is the probability
that x is accepted by Bob when the reveal information was r.
Let  denote the state of Bob’s system. Summation over x
now yields

x
px
A 
x,r
px,r
A
= 
x,r
Tr
xx
Ur
†Ur = 
r
Tr  = 
U
 ,
hence a log2
U
. 
In order to examine security against a dishonest Bob, we
have to consider the actual form of the unitaries. We first
show that there do indeed exist interesting protocols. Second,
we present a simple, implementable, protocol. To see that
interesting protocols can exist, let Alice choose a set of On4
unitaries independently according to the Haar measure ap-
proximated and announce the resulting set U to Bob. They
then perform LOCKCOM n ,U. Following the work of Ref.
38, we now show that this variant is secure against Bob
with high probability in the sense that there exist On4 uni-
taries that bring Bob’s accessible information down to a con-
stant: IaccE4.
Theorem 3. For n3, there exist n ,4 log2 n
+O1 ,4-QBSCIacc protocols.
Proof. Let Uran denote the set of m randomly chosen bases
and consider the LOCKCOM n ,Uran scheme using unitar-
ies U=Uran. Security against Alice is again given by lemma
4. We now need to show that this choice of unitaries achieves
the desired locking effect and thus security against Bob.
Again, let d=2n denote the dimension. It was observed in
Ref. 18 that
Iacc log2 d + max

i
1
m
HXj ,
where Xj denotes the outcome of the measurement of 
 in
basis j and the maximum is taken over all pure states 
.
According to Ref. 38 Appendix B there is a constant C
0 such that
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Prinf


1
m

j=1
m
HXj 1 − log2 d − 3
 10

2d2−mCd/2log2 d2−1,
for d7 and 2 /5. Set = 1log2 d . The right-hand side of the
above equation then decreases provided that m

8
C
log2 d4. Thus with d=2n and log2 m=4 log2 n+O1,
the accessible information is then Iacc log2 d− 1−log2 d
+3= log2 d+3=4 for our choice of . 
Unfortunately, the protocol is inefficient both in terms of
computation and communication. It remains open to find an
efficient constructive scheme with those parameters.
In contrast, for only two bases, an efficient construction
exists and uses the identity and the Hadamard transform as
unitaries. For this case, the security of the standard LOCK-
COM protocol follows immediately:
Theorem 4. LOCKCOM n , In ,Hn is a n ,1 ,n /2
−QBSCIacc protocol.
Proof. It is sufficient to apply lemma 4 and the fact that
for Bob Iaccn /2 18,39. 
V. CHEAT-SENSITIVE PROTOCOL
A. Cheat sensitivity
We now modify the protocol LOCKCOM n , In ,Hn
so that it becomes cheat sensitive against Bob. That is, even
though Bob has the possibility to gain information about the
committed string before the reveal phase, Alice has a decent
probability of catching Bob if he actually obtains a nonzero
amount of information 46,47. The modified protocol will
be denoted by CS-Bob-LOCKCOM n , In ,Hn.
Commit phase. Alice has the string x 0,1n and ran-
domly chooses r 0,1. She sends the state 
x to Bob if
r=0 and she sends Hn
x if r=1.
Reveal phase. Alice announces r. Bob applies Hn if r
=1 and does nothing if r=0. He then measures in the com-
putational basis to obtain x.
Confirmation phase. Bob sends x to Alice. If Alice is
honest she declares “accept” if x=x and otherwise “abort.”
As before, the cheat parameters are a=1 and b= n2 . The
definition of CS-Bob-LOCKCOM n ,U is analogous.
Note that a cheating Bob can deviate from the protocol
without being caught. This is so because any unitary trans-
formation plus the attachment of an ancilla by Bob is, by
definition, reversible. So, the focus has to be on the case
where Bob performs an irreversible operation. In quantum
mechanics, this corresponds to Bob performing a generalized
measurement POVM.
Now, whenever Bob performs a generalized measure-
ment, the situation can be equivalently formulated by Bob
splitting his system Y into C and Q where C is classical and
cannot be “touched” by Bob later on. Of course, if C con-
tains no information whatsoever about Alice’s commitment,
Bob cannot be caught. So, the interesting question to ask is
the case when C does contain information about Alice’s com-
mitment. In our paper, we quantify the amount of cheating
by Bob by the amount of classical mutual information the
system C contains about Alice’s commitment.
Recall that for any measurement that Bob performs on his
quantum state before the reveal phase, his outcome random
variable C will obey
IX;C
n
2
.
This bound can be achieved for a measurement in the com-
putational basis. If Bob actually performs this measurement,
then he obtains the correct string if r=0, i.e., with probability
one half, and a random and completely uncorrelated result if
r=1. It is then easy to see that Alice will abort in the confir-
mation phase with probability one half, i.e., she is able to
detect Bob with rather high probability.
The results in this section will imply that if Bob performs
any measurement with outcome random variable C where
IX ;C0, then Alice will detect him with strictly positive
probability corollary 1. In analogy to results regarding bit
commitment 28,29 we will therefore say that CS-Bob-
LOCKCOM n , In ,Hn is cheat sensitive against Bob. In
the following we derive an information-gain vs detection
tradeoff which implies the mentioned cheat-sensitivity result.
B. Information-gain vs detection
Before we start explaining the tradeoff, recall that theo-
rem 4 states that CS-Bob-LOCKCOM n , In ,Hn is an
n ,1 ,n /2-Iacc-quantum string commitment protocol. This
result can be extended to dimensions different from d=2n:
one can show using Ref. 39, corollary 3 that CS-Bob-
LOCKCOM log2 d , I ,U, where U is the Fourier trans-
form, is a log2 d ,1 ,
log2 d
2 -Iacc-quantum string commitment
protocol. The results presented in the following will concern
this larger class of protocols.
In Sec. IV we quantified Bob’s cheating as the mutual
information of the committed string X and the outcome ran-
dom variable C of a measurement before the reveal phase.
We can model this measurement process as a unitary evolu-
tion Vcheat that splits the system Y that Bob obtains from
Alice during the commit phase into C and Q. Since C is
classical we can assume without loss of generality that Q
contains a copy of C. Any further action by Bob during the
protocol can thus be assumed not to involve C.
In the following it will prove handy to lift the restriction
of classicality on system C and only assume that the unitary
Vcheat splits Y into C and Q and that Bob will not touch C
during the rest of the protocol. Since this only increases
Bob’s power, any proof of cheat-sensitivity in this scenario
will imply cheat sensitivity in the weaker scenario. The mu-
tual information IX ;C will correspondingly be generalized
to the Holevo information between X and C: EC, where
EC= px ,xC denotes Bob’s ensemble with respect to X in
register C. Our main result is the following information-gain
vs detection tradeoff.
Theorem 5. If Alice and Bob run the protocol CS-Bob-
LOCKCOM log2 d , I ,U and if Bob is detected cheating
with probability less than p, then the Holevo information in
register C obeys
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EC 4	p log2 d + 22	p .
As an immediate corollary we find that CS-Bob-LOCKCOM
log2 d , I ,U and, in particular, CS-Bob-LOCKCOM
n , In ,Hn is cheat sensitive against Bob.
Corollary 1. If Alice and Bob run the protocol CS-Bob-
LOCKCOM log2 d , I ,U, if Bob performs a measurement
before the reveal phase and if his outcome random variable
C obeys IX ;C0, then he will be detected by Alice with
probability p0.
C. Proof of theorem 5
We start this section with a description of the sequence of
events for the case where Alice is honest and Bob applies a
general cheating strategy as outlined above see also Fig. 2.
The commit phase of the protocol LOCKCOM
log2 d , I ,U is equivalent to the following procedure: Al-
ice prepares the state

 =
1
	2dx,r 
x
X
rR
rRUr
xY
on the system XRYR and sends system Y over a noiseless
quantum channel to Bob. It is understood that U0= I and
U1=U. Note that R contains an identical copy of R and
corresponds to the reveal information.
Bob’s most general cheating operation can be described
by a unitary matrix Vcheat that splits the system Y into C and
Q. C contains by definition the information gathered during
cheating and is not touched upon later on
Vcheat:Y → CQ .
The map Vcheat followed by the partial trace over Q is
denoted by C and likewise Vcheat followed by the partial
trace over C is denoted by Q. Alice sends the reveal infor-
mation R to Bob. Bob applies a preparation unitary Vprepare
to his system. Since C will not be touched upon, the most
general operation acts on RQ only:
Vprepare:RQ → RST .
Bob then sends S to Alice and keeps T. Alice measures S
in the computational basis and compares the outcome to her
value in X. If the values do not agree, we say that Alice has
detected Bob cheating. The probability for this happening is
given by
1
dx=1
d
1 − Tr
xx
x
S ,
where x
S
=TrXRRT
xx



XRRST and 
XRRST is the pure
state of the total system after Bob’s application of Vprepare.
Note that Alice measures in the computational basis since for
honest Bob Vprepare=r0,1
rr
 U
r†, in which case
his outcome agrees with the committed value of an honest
Alice.
Before we start with the proof of theorem 5, we define
ensembles depending on the classical information contained
in XR, i.e., for Z C ,Q, define ErZ= px ,xrZ  with
xr
Z
=
1
pxpr
TrXRRCQ\Z
xrxr



XRRCQ
and for Z S ,T let ErZ= px ,xrZ  with
xr
Z
= TrXRRCST\Z
xrxr



XRRCST
.
Sometimes we are only interested in the ensemble averaged
over the values of r: for Z C ,Q ,S ,T
EZ = px,xZ, where xZ =
1
2
x0
Z + x1
Z  . 5
We now come to two technical lemmas, most notably a
channel uncertainty relation lemma 5 that was discovered
in connection with squashed entanglement: Consider a uni-
form ensemble E0=  1d , 
ii=1d of basis states of a Hilbert space
H and the ensemble E1=  1d ,U
ii=1d rotated with a unitary U.
Application of the completely positive trace preserving
CPTP map  with output in a potentially different Hilbert
space results in the two ensembles
E0 = 1d ,
ii
, E1 = 1d ,U
ii
U†
with Holevo information for E0 given by
FIG. 2. Execution of CS-Bob-LOCKCOM with honest Alice on
the left and cheating Bob on the right. Time flows downwards.
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„E0… = H1di 
ii
 − 1di H
ii

and similarly for E1. Consider also the quantum mutual in-
formation of  relative to the maximally mixed state = 1d I,
which is the average state of either E0 or E1:
I; = H + H − HI  
dd
 ,
where 
d is a maximally entangled state in dimension d
purifying .
Lemma 5 (Channel uncertainty relation [39]). Let U be
the Fourier transform of dimension d, i.e., of the Abelian
group Zd of integers modulo d. More generally, U can be a
Fourier transform of any finite Abelian group labeling the
ensemble E0, e.g., for d=2l, and the group Z2l , U=H l with
the Hadamard transform H of a qubit. Then for all CPTP
maps ,
„E0… + „E1… I; . 6
The following technical lemma is a technical consequence of
Fannes’ inequality.
Lemma 6. Let E= pi ,i= 
ii
 be an ensemble of pure
states and E˜ = pi ,	i be an ensemble of mixed states, both on
Cd. If ipii
	i
i1− p, then

E˜ − E
 4	p log2 d + 22	p ,
where x=min−x log2 x ,
1
e
.
Proof. The justification of the estimate
p
i
pi1 − Tr i	i
i
pii
2  
i
pii2,
where i=i ,	i is as follows: the second inequality is a
standard relation between the fidelity and the trace distance
and the third follows from the convexity of the square func-
tion. Strong convexity of the trace distance implies  ,	
	p. Fannes’ inequality will be applied to the overall state

H − H	
 2	p log2 d + min2	p, 1
e
 ,
where x=−x log2 x, and to the individual ones

i
pi
H	i − Hi
 
i
pii2 log2 d
+ 
i
pimin2i, 1
e

 	p2 log2 d + min2	p, 1
e
 ,
where the last inequality is true by the concavity of x.
Inserting these estimates in the Holevo  quantities E
=H and E˜=H	−ipiH	i concludes the proof. 
Proof [Proof of theorem 5]. Let E0 and E1 be defined as in
lemma 5. In the commit phase of the protocol, Alice chooses
one of the ensembles each with probability 12 , and one of
the states in the ensemble each with probability 1d . The
justifications for the following estimate are given in a list
below:
E0C + E1C , 7
=„CE0… + „CE1… , 8
IXRR;C , 9
=2HXRR − IXRR;Q , 10
2HXRR − „QE0… − „QE1… , 11
=2HXR − E0Q − E1Q , 12
2HXR − „0SE0Q… − „1SE1Q… , 13
=2HXR − E0S − E1S , 14
2HXR − 2ES . 15
The justifications. Equality 8: By definition of the string
commitment scheme and the map C: ErC= px ,xrC 
= px ,CUr
xx
U†r= :CEr. Inequality 9: Applica-
tion of lemma 5 for the map C. Note that system XRR is a
reference system for the completely mixed state on system Y
on which the channel C is applied. Hence I ;C
= IXRR ;C. Equality 10: Simple rewriting of the entropy
terms making use of the definition of quantum mutual infor-
mation and the purity of XRRCQ. Inequality 11: Applica-
tion of lemma 5 for the map Q. Note that system XRR is a
reference system for the completely mixed state on system Y
on which the channel Q is applied. Hence I ;Q
= IXRR ;Q. Equality 12: R is a copy of R: HXRR
=HXR. By definition of the string commitment scheme and
the map Q: ErQ= px ,xrQ = px ,QUr
xx
U†r. Inequal-
ity 13 and equality 14: follow from the data processing
inequality (HErQ)ErQ and from the definition
HErQ=ErS. Inequality 15: Finally ES= px ,xS= 12 x0S
+x1
S , which by the concavity of von Neumann entropy
implies ES 12 E0S+E1S.
If Bob is detected cheating with probability less than p,
then by lemma 6 the Holevo quantity ES of the ensemble
given in S that Bob sends to Alice obeys
ES 1 − 4	plog2 d − 22	p . 16
Inserting inequality 16 into inequality 15 and noting that
HXR=HY=log2 d proves the claim. 
This proves cheat-sensitivity against Bob for the simplest
protocol of the LOCKCOM family.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a framework for quantum commit-
ments to a string of bits. Even though string commitments
are weaker than bit commitments, we showed that under
strong security requirements, there are no such nontrivial
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protocols. A property of quantum states known as locking,
however, allowed us to propose meaningful protocols for a
weaker security demand. Since the completion of our origi-
nal work 40, Tsurumaru 41 has also proposed a different
QBSC protocol within our framework.
Furthermore, we have shown that one such protocol can
be made cheat sensitive. It is an interesting open question to
derive a tradeoff between Bob’s ability to gain information
and Alice’s ability to detect him cheating for the protocol of
theorem 3 as well.
A drawback of weakening the security requirement is that
LOCKCOM protocols are not necessarily composable. Thus,
if LOCKCOM is used as a subprotocol in a larger protocol,
the security of the resulting scheme has to be evaluated on a
case by case basis. However, LOCKCOM protocols are se-
cure when executed in parallel. This is a consequence of the
definition of Alice’s security parameter and the additivity of
the accessible information 42,43, and sufficient for many
cryptographic purposes.
Nonetheless, two important open questions remain. First,
how can we construct efficient protocols using more than
two bases? It may be tempting to conclude that we could
simply use a larger number of mutually unbiased bases, such
as given by the identity and Hadamard transform. Yet, it has
been shown 44 that using more mutually unbiased bases
does not necessarily lead to a better locking effect and thus
better string commitment protocols. Second, are there any
real-life applications for this weak quantum string commit-
ment?
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